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Abstract
The betweenness property of preference relations states that a probability mixture
of two lotteries should lie between them in preference. It is a weakened form of the inde-
pendence property and hence satisfied in expected utility theory (EUT). Experimental
violations of betweenness are well-documented and several preference theories, notably
cumulative prospect theory (CPT), do not satisfy betweenness. We prove that CPT pref-
erences satisfy betweenness if and only if they conform with EUT preferences. In game
theory, lack of betweenness in the players’ preference relations makes it essential to
distinguish between the two interpretations of a mixed action by a player – conscious
randomizations by the player and the uncertainty in the beliefs of the opponents. We
elaborate on this distinction and study its implication for the definition of Nash equilib-
rium. This results in four different notions of equilibrium, with pure and mixed action
Nash equilibrium being two of them. We dub the other two pure and mixed black-
box strategy Nash equilibrium respectively. We resolve the issue of existence of such
equilibria and examine how these different notions of equilibrium compare with each
other.
1 Introduction
There is a large amount of evidence that human agents as decision-makers do not con-
form to the independence axiom of expected utility theory (EUT). (See, for example,
Allais [1953], Weber and Camerer [1987] and Machina [1992].) This has led to the
study of several alternate theories that do away with the independence axiom [Machina,
2014]. Amongst these, the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) of Tversky and Kahneman
[1992] stands out since it accommodates many of the empirically observed behavioral
features from human experiments without losing much analytical tractability [Wakker,
2010]. Further, it includes EUT as a special case.
The independence axiom says that if lottery L1 is weakly preferred over lottery L2 by
an agent (i.e. the agent wants lottery L1 at least as much as lottery L2), and L is some
other lottery, then, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the combined lottery αL1 + (1 − α)L is weakly pre-
ferred over the combined lottery αL2 + (1−α)L by that agent. A weakened form of the
independence axiom, called betweenness, says that if lottery L1 is weakly preferred over
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lottery L2 (by an agent), then, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the mixed lottery L = αL1 +(1−α)L2
must lie between the lotteries L1 and L2 in preference. Betweenness implies that if an
agent is indifferent between L1 and L2, then she is indifferent between any mixtures of
them too. It is known that independence implies betweenness, but betweenness does
not imply independence [Chew, 1989]. As a result, EUT preferences, which are known
to satisfy the independence axiom, also satisfy betweenness. CPT preferences, on the
other hand, do not satisfy betweenness in general (see example 2.2). In fact, in theo-
rem 2.3, we show that CPT preferences satisfy betweenness if and only if they are EUT
preferences (recall that EUT preferences are a special case of CPT preferences). Several
empirical studies show systematic violations of betweenness [Camerer and Ho, 1994,
Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017, Dwenger et al., 2012, Sopher and Narramore, 2000], and
this makes the use of CPT more attractive than EUT for modeling human preferences.
Further evidence comes from Camerer and Ho [1994], where the authors fit data from
nine studies using three non-EUTmodels, one of them being CPT, to find that, compared
to the EUT model, the non-EUT models perform better.
Suppose in a non-cooperative game that given her beliefs about the other players, a
player is indifferent between two of her actions. Then according to EUT, she should be
indifferent between any of the mixtures of these two actions. This facilitates the proof
of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed actions for such games. However, with
CPT preferences, the player could either prefer some mixture of these two actions over
the individual actions or vice versa.
As a result, it is important tomake a distinction in CPT regarding whether the players
can actively randomize over their actions or not. One way to enable active randomiza-
tion is by assuming that each player has access to a randomizing device and the player
can “commit” to the outcome of this randomization. The commitment assumption is
necessary, as is evident from the following scenario (the gambles presented below ap-
pear in Prelec [1990]). Alice needs to choose between the following two actions:
1. Action 1 results in a lottery L1 = {(0.34, $20,000); (0.66, $0)}, i.e. she receives
$20,000 with probability 0.34 and nothing with probability 0.66.
2. Action 2 results in a lottery L2 = {(0.17, $30,000); (0.83, $0)}.
(See example 3.7 for an instance of a 2-player game with Alice and Bob, where Alice has
two actions that result in the above two lotteries.) Note that L1 is a less risky gamble
with a lower reward and L2 is a more risky gamble with a higher reward. Now consider
a compound lottery L = 16/17L1 + 1/17L2. Substituting for the lotteries L1 and L2 we
get L in its reduced form to be
L = {(0.01, $30,000); (0.32, $20,000); (0.67, $0)}.
In example 2.1, we provide a CPT model for Alice’s preferences that result in lottery L1
being preferred over lottery L2, whereas lottery L is preferred over lotteries L1 and L2.
Roughly speaking, the underlying intuition is that Alice is risk-averse in general, and
she prefers lottery L1 over lottery L2. However, she overweights the small 1% chance
of getting $30,000 in L and finds it lucrative enough to make her prefer lottery L over
both the lotteries L1 and L2. Let us say Alice has a biased coin that she can use to
implement the randomized strategy. Now, if Alice tossed the coin, and the outcome was
to play action 2, then in the absence of commitment, she will switch to action 1, since
she prefers lottery L1 over lottery L2. Commitment can be achieved, for example, by
asking a trusted party to implement the randomized strategy for her or use a device
that would carry out the randomization and implement the outcome without further
consultation with Alice. Regardless of the implementation mechanism, we will call such
randomized strategies black-box strategies. The above problem of commitment is closely
related to the problem of using non-EUTmodels in dynamic decisions. For an interesting
discussion on this topic, see Wakker [2010, Appendix C] and the references therein.
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Traditionally, mixed actions have been considered from two viewpoints, especially in
the context of mixed action Nash equilibrium. According to the first viewpoint, these are
conscious randomizations by the players – each player only knows her mixed action and
not its pure realization. The notion of black-box strategies captures this interpretation
of mixed actions. According to the other viewpoint, players do not randomize, and each
player chooses some definite action, but the other players need not knowwhich one, and
the mixture represents their uncertainty, i.e. their conjecture about her choice. Aumann
and Brandenburger [1995] establish mixed action Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium
in conjectures provided they satisfy certain epistemic conditions regarding the common
knowledge amongst the players.
In the absence of the betweenness condition, these two viewpoints give rise to dif-
ferent notions of Nash equilibria. Throughout we assume that the player set and their
corresponding action sets and payoff functions, as well as the rationality of each player,
are common knowledge. A player is said to be rational if, given her beliefs and her pref-
erences, she does not play any suboptimal strategy. Suppose each player plays a fixed
action, and these fixed actions are common knowledge, then we get back the notion of
pure Nash equilibrium (see definition 3.2). If each player plays a fixed action, but the
other players have mixed conjectures over her action, and these conjectures are com-
mon knowledge, then this gives us mixed action Nash equilibrium (see definition 3.4).
This coincides with the notion of Nash equilibrium as defined in Keskin [2016] and
studied further in Phade and Anantharam [2019]. Now suppose each player can ran-
domize over her actions and hence implement a black-box strategy. If each player plays
a fixed black-box strategy and these black-box strategies are common knowledge, then
this gives rise to a new notion of equilibrium. We call it black-box strategy Nash equilib-
rium (see definition 3.8). If each player plays a fixed black-box strategy and the other
players have mixed conjectures over her black-box strategy, and these conjectures are
common knowledge, then we get the notion ofmixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium
(see definition 3.10).
In the setting of an n-player normal form game with real valued payoff functions,
the pure Nash equilibria do not depend on the specific CPT features of the players, i.e.
the reference point, the value function and the two probability weighting functions,
one for gains and one for losses. Hence the traditional result on the lack of guarantee
for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium continues to hold when players have CPT
preferences. Keskin [2016] proves the existence of a mixed action Nash equilibrium for
any finite game when players have CPT preferences. In example 3.9, we show that a
finite game may not have any black-box strategy Nash equilibrium. On the other hand,
in theorem 3.12, we prove our main result that for any finite game with players hav-
ing CPT preferences, there exists a mixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium. If the
players have EUT preferences, then the notions of black-box strategy Nash equilibrium
and mixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium are equivalent to the notion of mixed
action Nash equilibrium (when interpreted appropriately; see the remark before propo-
sition 3.14; see also figure 6).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the CPT setup and es-
tablish that under this setup betweenness is equivalent to independence (theorem 2.3).
In section 3, we describe an n-player non-cooperative game setup and define various
notions of Nash equilibrium in the absence of betweenness, in particular with CPT pref-
erences. We discuss the questions concerning their existence and how these different
notions of equilibria compare with each other. In section 4, we conclude with a table
that summarizes the results.
To close this section, we introduce some notational conventions that will be used in
the document. IfZ is a Polish space (complete separable metric space), letP(Z) denote
the set of all probability measures on (Z,F ), where F is the Borel sigma-algebra of
Z. Let supp(p) denote the support of a distribution p ∈ P(Z), i.e. the smallest closed
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subset of Z such that p(Z) = 1. Let ∆f (Z) ⊂ P(Z) denote the set of all probability
distributions that have a finite support. For any element p ∈ ∆f (Z), let p[z] denote the
probability of z ∈ Z assigned by p. For z ∈ Z, let 1{z} ∈ ∆f (Z) denote the probability
distribution such that p[z] = 1. If Z is finite (and hence a Polish space with respect to
the discrete topology), let ∆(Z) denote the set of all probability distributions on the set
Z, viz.
∆(Z) =P(Z) = ∆f (Z) =
{
(p[z])z∈Z
∣∣∣∣p[z] ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ Z,∑
z∈Z
p[z] = 1
}
,
with the usual topology. Let∆m−1 denote the standard (m−1)-simplex, i.e. ∆({1, . . . ,m}).
If Z is a subset of a Euclidean space, then let co(Z) denote the convex hull of Z, and let
co(Z) denote the closed convex hull of Z.
2 Cumulative Prospect Theory and Betweenness
We first describe the setup for CPT (for more details see Wakker [2010]). Each person
is associated with a reference point r ∈ R, a value function v : R→ R, and two probability
weighting functions w± : [0, 1] → [0, 1], w+ for gains and w− for losses. The function
v(x) satisfies: (i) it is continuous in x, (ii) v(r) = 0, (iii) it is strictly increasing in
x. The value function is generally assumed to be convex in the losses frame (x < r)
and concave in the gains frame (x ≥ r), and to be steeper in the losses frame than
in the gains frame in the sense that v(r − z) ≤ −v(r + z) for all z ≥ 0. However,
these assumptions are not needed for the results in this paper to hold. The probability
weighting functions w± : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfy: (i) they are continuous, (ii) they are
strictly increasing, (iii) w±(0) = 0 and w±(1) = 1. We say that (r, v, w±) are the CPT
features of that person.
Suppose a person faces a lottery (or prospect) L := {(pk, zk)}1≤k≤m, where zk ∈
R, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, denotes an outcome and pk, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, is the probability with which
outcome zk occurs. We assume that
∑m
k=1 pk = 1. (Note that we are allowed to have
pk = 0 for some values of k, and we can have zk = zk′ even when k 6= k′.) Let
z := (zk)1≤k≤m and p := (pk)1≤k≤m. We denote L as (p, z) and refer to the vector z as
an outcome profile and p as a probability vector.
Let α := (α1, . . . , αm) be a permutation of (1, . . . ,m) such that
zα1 ≥ zα2 ≥ · · · ≥ zαm . (2.1)
Let 0 ≤ kr ≤ m be such that zαk ≥ r for 1 ≤ k ≤ kr and zαk < r for kr < k ≤ m.
(Here kr = 0 when zαk < r for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m.) The CPT value V (L) of the prospect L is
evaluated using the value function v(·) and the probability weighting functions w±(·)
as follows:
V (L) :=
kr∑
k=1
pi+k (p, α)v(zαk) +
m∑
k=kr+1
pi−k (p, α)v(zαk), (2.2)
where pi+k (p, α), 1 ≤ k ≤ kr, and pi−k (p, α), kr < k ≤ m, are decision weights defined via:
pi+1 (p, α) := w
+(pα1),
pi+k (p, α) := w
+(pα1 + · · ·+ pαk)− w+(pα1 + · · ·+ pαk−1) for 1 < k ≤ m,
pi−k (p, α) := w
−(pαm + · · ·+ pαk)− w−(pαm + · · ·+ pαk+1) for 1 ≤ k < m,
pi−m(p, α) := w
−(pαm).
Although the expression on the right in equation (2.2) depends on the permutation
α, one can check that the formula evaluates to the same value V (L) as long as the
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permutation α satisfies (2.1). The CPT value in equation (2.2) can equivalently be
written as:
V (L) =
kr−1∑
k=1
w+
(
k∑
i=1
pαi
)[
v(zαk)− v(zαk+1)
]
+ w+
(
kr∑
i=1
pαi
)
v
(
zαkr
)
+ w−
(
m∑
i=kr+1
pαi
)
v(zαkr+1)
+
m−1∑
k=kr+1
w−
(
m∑
i=k+1
pαi
)[
v(zαk+1)− v(zαk)
]
. (2.3)
A person is said to have CPT preferences if, given a choice between prospect L1 and
prospect L2, she chooses the one with higher CPT value.
We now define some axioms for preferences over lotteries. We are interested in “mix-
tures” of lotteries, i.e. lotteries with other lotteries as outcomes. Consider a (two-stage)
compound lottery K := {(qj , Lj)}1≤j≤t, where Lj = (pj , zj), 1 ≤ j ≤ t, are lotteries
over real outcomes and qj is the chance of lottery Lj . We assume that
∑t
j=1 q
j = 1. A
two-stage compound lottery can be reduced to a single-stage lottery by multiplying the
probability vector pj corresponding to the lottery Lj by qj for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, and
then adding the probabilities of identical outcomes across all the lotteries Lj , 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
Let
∑t
j=1 q
jLj denote the reduced lottery corresponding to the compound lottery K.
Let  denote a preference relation over single-stage lotteries. We assume  to be a
weak order, i.e.  is transitive (if L1  L2 and L2  L3, then L1  L3) and complete
(for all L1, L2, we have L1  L2 or L2  L1, where possibly both preferences hold).
The additional binary relations ,∼,≺ and  are derived from  in the usual manner.
A preference relation is a CPT preference relation if there exist CPT features (r, v, w±)
such that L1  L2 iff V (L1) ≤ V (L2). Note that a CPT preference relation is a weak
order. A preference relation  satisfies independence if for any lotteries L1, L2 and L,
and any constant 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, L1  L2 implies αL1 + (1 − α)L  αL2 + (1 − α)L. A
preference relation  satisfies betweenness if for any lotteries L1  L2, we have L1 
αL1 + (1 − α)L2  L2, for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. A preference relation  satisfies weak
betweenness if for any lotteriesL1 ∼ L2, we haveL1 ∼ αL1+(1−α)L2, for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Suppose a preference relation  satisfies independence. Then L1  L2 implies
L1 = αL1 + (1− α)L1  αL1 + (1− α)L2  αL2 + (1− α)L2 = L2.
Thus, if a preference relation satisfies independence, then it satisfies betweenness. Also,
if a preference relation satisfies betweenness, then it satifies weak betweenness.
In the following example, we will provide CPT features for Alice so that her prefer-
ences agree with those described in section 1. This example also shows that cumulative
prospect theory can give rise to preferences that do not satisfy betweenness.
Example 2.1. Recall that Alice is faced with the following three lotteries:
L1 = {(0.34, $20, 000); (0.66, $0)},
L2 = {(0.17, $30, 000); (0.83, $0)},
L = {(0.01, $30, 000); (0.32, $20, 000); (0.67, $0)}.
Let r = 0 be the reference point of Alice. Thus all the outcomes lie in the gains domain.
Let v(x) = x0.8 for x ≥ 0; Alice is risk-averse in the gains domain. Let the probability
weighting function for gains be given by
w+(p) = exp{−(− ln p)0.6},
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Figure 1: The solid curve shows the probability weighting function for Alice from exam-
ple 2.1 and example 3.7, and the dashed curve shows the probability weighting function
for Charlie from example 2.2.
a form suggested by Prelec [1998] (see figure 1). We won’t need the probability weight-
ing function for losses. Direct computations show that V (L1) = 968.96, V (L2) = 932.29,
and V (L) = 1022.51 (all decimal numbers in this example are correct to two decimal
places). Thus the preference behavior of Alice, as described in section 1 (i.e., she prefers
L1 over L2, but prefers L over L1 and L2), is consistent with CPT and can be modeled,
for example, with the CPT features stated here.
The following example shows that CPT can give rise to preferences that do not satisfy
weak betweenness (the lotteries and the CPT features presented below appear in Keskin
[2016]).
Example 2.2. Suppose Charlie has r = 0 as his reference point and v(x) = x as his value
function. Let his probability weighting function for gains be given by
w+(p) = exp{−(− ln p)0.5}.
(See figure 1.) We won’t need the probability weighting function for losses since we
consider only outcomes in the gains domain in this example. Consider the lotteries
L1 = {(0.5, 2β); (0.5, 0)} and L2 = {(0.5, β + 1); (0.5, 1)}, where β = 1/w+(0.5) =
2.299 (all decimal numbers in this example are correct to three decimal places). Direct
computations reveal that V (L1) = V (L2) = 2.000 > V (0.5L1 + 0.5L2) = 1.985.
Given a utility function u : R → R (assumed to be continuous and strictly in-
creasing), the expected utility of a lottery L = {(pk, zk)}1≤k≤m is defined as U(L) :=∑m
k=1 pku(zk). A preference relation  is said to be an EUT preference relation if there
exists a utility function u such that L1  L2 iff U(L1) ≤ U(L2). Note that if the CPT
probability weighting functions are linear, i.e. w±(p) = p for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, then the
CPT value of a lottery coincides with the expected utility of that lottery with respect to
the utility function u = v. It is well known that EUT preference relations satisfy inde-
pendence and hence betweenness. Several generalizations of EUT have been obtained
by weakening the independence axiom and assuming only betweenness, for example,
weighted utility theory [Chew and MacCrimmon, 1979, Chew, 1983], skew-symmetric
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bilinear utility [Fishburn, 1988, Bordley and Hazen, 1991], implicit expected utility
[Dekel, 1986, Chew, 1989] and disappointment aversion theory [Gul, 1991, Bordley,
1992]. The following theorem shows that in the restricted setting of CPT preferences,
betweenness and independence are equivalent.
Theorem 2.3. If  is a CPT preference relation, then the following are equivalent:
(i)  is an EUT preference relation,
(ii)  satisfies independence,
(iii)  satisfies betweenness.
Proof. Let the CPT preference relation be given by (r, v, w±). Since an EUT preference
relation satisfies independence, we get that (i) implies (ii). Since betweenness is a
weaker condition than independence, we get that (ii) implies (iii). We will now show
that if  satisfies betweenness, then the probability weighting functions are linear, i.e.
w±(p) = p for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. This will imply that  is an EUT preference relation with
utility function u = v, and hence complete the proof.
Assume that the CPT preference relation satisfies betweenness. Consider a lottery
A := {(p1, z1), (p2, z2), (1 − p1 − p2, r)} such that z1 ≥ z2 ≥ r, p1 ≥ 0, p2 > 0 and
p1 + p2 ≤ 1. By (2.3), we have
V (A) = δ1w
+(P1) + δ2w
+(P2),
where δ1 := v(z1) − v(z2), δ2 := v(z2), P1 := p1 and P2 := p1 + p2. Let lottery
B := {(q1, z1), (q2, z2), (1 − q1 − q2, r)} be such that q1, q2 ≥ 0, Q1 := q1 > p1, and
Q2 := q1 + q2 < P2. By (2.3), we have
V (B) = δ1w
+(Q1) + δ2w
+(Q2).
If z1, z2, p1, p2, q1 and q2 are such that
δ1
δ2
=
w+(P2)− w+(Q2)
w+(Q1)− w+(P1) , (2.4)
then V (A) = V (B) and, by betweenness, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 we have V (A) = V (B) =
V (αA+ (1− α)B), i.e.
δ1w
+(Q1) + δ2w
+(Q2) = δ1w
+(αP1 + (1− α)Q1) + δ2w+(αP2 + (1− α)Q2).
Using (2.4) we get[
w+(P2)− w+(Q2)
] [
w+(Q1)− w+(αP1 + (1− α)Q1))
]
=
[
w+(Q1)− w+(P1)
] [
w+(αP2 + (1− α)Q2)− w+(Q2)
]
.
(2.5)
Given any 0 ≤ P1 < Q1 ≤ Q2 < P2 ≤ 1, there exist z1 and z2 such that (2.4) holds.
Indeed, take any δ > 0 belonging to the range of the function v. This exists because
v(r) = 0 and v is a strictly increasing function. Since w+ is a strictly increasing function,
we have
κ :=
w+(P2)− w+(Q2)
w+(Q1)− w+(P1) > 0.
Take z2 = v−1(δ/(1 + κ)) and z1 = v−1(δ). These are well defined because v is assumed
to be continuous and strictly increasing, and δ belongs to its range. Hence z1 > z2 > r
as required. Thus (2.5) holds for any 0 ≤ P1 < Q1 ≤ Q2 < P2 ≤ 1. In particular, when
Q1 = Q2, we have[
w+(P2)− w+(Q)
] [
w+(Q)− w+(R1)
]
=
[
w+(Q)− w+(P1)
] [
w+(R2)− w+(Q)
]
,
7
where Q := Q1 = Q2, R1 := αP1 + (1− α)Q and R2 := αP2 + (1− α)Q. Equivalently,
for any 0 ≤ a1 < c1 < b < c2 < a2 ≤ 1 such that (a2 − b)(b− c1) = (b− a1)(c2 − b), we
have [
w+(a2)− w+(b)
] [
w+(b)− w+(c1)
]
=
[
w+(b)− w+(a1)
] [
w+(c2)− w+(b)
]
.
In lemma B.1, we prove that the above condition implies w+(p) = p, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Similarly, we can show that w−(p) = p, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. This completes the proof.
3 Equilibrium in black-box strategies
We now consider an n-player non-cooperative game where the players have CPT prefer-
ences. We will discuss several notions of equilibrium for such a game and will contrast
them.
Let Γ := (N, (Ai)i∈N , (xi)i∈N ) denote a game, where N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of
players, Ai is the finite action set of player i, and xi : A → R is the payoff function for
player i. Here A :=
∏
iAi denotes the set of all action profiles a := (a1, . . . , an). Let
A−i :=
∏
i 6=j Aj denote the set of action profiles a−i of all players except player i.
Definition 3.1. For any action profile a−i ∈ A−i of the opponents, we define the best
response action set of player i to be
Ai(a−i) := arg max
ai∈Ai
xi(ai, a−i). (3.1)
Definition 3.2. An action profile a = (a1, . . . , an) is said to be a pure Nash equilibrium if
for each player i ∈ N , we have
ai ∈ Ai(a−i).
The notion of pure Nash equilibrium is the same whether the players have CPT
preferences or EUT preferences because only deterministic lotteries, comprised of being
offered one outcome with probability 1, are considered in the framework of this notion.
It is well known that for any given game Γ, a pure Nash equilibrium need not exist.
Let µ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) denote a belief of player i on the action profiles of her opponents.
Given the belief µ−i of player i, if she decides to play action ai, then she will face the
lottery {(µ−i[a−i], xi(ai, a−i))}a−i∈A−i .
Definition 3.3. For any belief µ−i ∈ ∆(A−i), define the best response action set of player
i as
Ai(µ−i) := arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi
(
{(µ−i[a−i], xi(ai, a−i))}a−i∈A−i
)
. (3.2)
Note that this definition is consistent with the definition of the best response action
set that takes an action profile a−i of the opponents as its input (definition 3.1), if we
interpret a−i as the belief 1{a−i} ∈ ∆(A−i), since Ai(1{a−i}) = Ai(a−i).
Let σi ∈ ∆(Ai) denote a conjecture over the action of player i. Let σ := (σ1, . . . , σn)
denote a profile of conjectures, and let σ−i := (σj)j 6=i denote the profile of conjectures for
all players except player i. Let µ−i(σ−i) ∈ ∆(A−i) be the belief induced by conjectures
σj , j 6= i, given by
µ−i(σ−i)[a−i] :=
∏
j 6=i
σj [a−i],
which is nothing but the product distribution induced by σ−i.
Definition 3.4. A conjecture profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is said to be a mixed action Nash
equilibrium if, for each player i, we have
ai ∈ Ai(µ−i(σ−i)), for all ai ∈ suppσi.
8
In other words, the conjecture σi over the action of player i should assign positive
probabilities to only optimal actions of player i, given her belief µ−i(σ−i).
It is well known that a mixed Nash equilibrium exists for every game with EUT
players, see Nash [1951]. Keskin [2016] generalizes the result of Nash [1951] on the
existence of a mixed action Nash equilibrium to the case when players have CPT pref-
erences.
Let Bi := ∆(Ai) denote the set of all black-box strategies for player i with a typical
element denoted by bi ∈ Bi. Recall that if player i implements a black-box strategy
bi, then we interpret this as a trusted party other than the player sampling an action
ai ∈ Ai from the distribution bi and playing action ai on behalf of player i. We assume
the usual topology on Bi. Let B :=
∏
iBi and B−i :=
∏
j 6=iBj with typical elements
denoted by b and b−i, respectively.
Note that, although a conjecture σi and a black-box strategy bi are mathematically
equivalent, viz. they are elements of the same set Bi = ∆(Ai), they have different
interpretations. We will call si ∈ ∆(Ai) a mixture of actions of player i when we want
to be agnostic to which interpretation is being imposed. Let Si := ∆(Ai), S :=
∏
i ∆(Ai)
and S−i :=
∏
j 6=i Si with typical elements denoted by si, s and s−i, respectively. (Note
that S 6= ∆(A) unless all but one player have singleton action sets.)
For any belief µ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) and any black-box strategy bi of player i, let µ(bi, µ−i) ∈
∆(A) denote the product distribution given by
µ(bi, µ−i)[a] := bi[ai]µ−i[a−i].
Given the belief µ−i of player i, if she decides to implement the black-box strategy bi,
then she will face the lottery {µ(bi, µ−i)[a], xi(a))}a∈A.
Definition 3.5. For any belief µ−i ∈ ∆(A−i), define the best response black-box strategy
set of player i as
Bi(µ−i) := arg max
bi∈Bi
Vi
({(µ(bi, µ−i)[a], xi(a))}a∈A) .
Lemma 3.6. For any belief µ−i, the set Bi(µ−i) is non-empty, and
co(Bi(µ−i)) = co(Bi(µ−i)).
Proof. For a lottery L = (p, z), where z = (zk)1≤k≤m is the outcome profile, and
(pk)1≤k≤m is the probability vector, the function Vi(p, z) is continuous with respect to
p ∈ ∆m−1 [Keskin, 2016]. Thus, Vi({(µ(bi, µ−i)[a], xi(a))}a∈A) is a function continuous
with respect to bi ∈ Bi, and henceBi(µ−i) is a non-empty closed subset of the compact
space Bi. Since the convex hull of a compact subset of a Euclidean space is compact
[Rudin, 1991, Chapter 3], the set co(Bi(µ−i)) is closed. This completes the proof.
Let us compare the two concepts: the best response action set (definition 3.3) and
the best response black-box strategy set (definition 3.5). Even though both of them
take the belief µ−i of player i as input, the best response action set Ai(µ−i) outputs
a collection of actions of player i, whereas the best response black-box strategy set
Bi(µ−i) outputs a collection of black-box strategies of player i, which are probability
distributions over the set of actions ai ∈ Ai. If we interpret an action ai as the mixture
1{ai} ∈ Si = ∆(Ai), and a black-box strategy bi as a mixture as well, then we can
compare the two sets A (µ−i) and B(µ−i) as subsets of Si. The following example
shows that, in general, the two sets can be disjoint, and hence quite distinct.
Example 3.7. We consider a 2-player game. Let Alice be player 1, with action set
A1 = {1, 2}, and let Bob be player 2, with action set A2 = {1, 2, 3}. Let the payoff func-
tion for Alice be as shown in figure 2. Let µ−1 = (0.17, 0.17, 0.66) ∈ ∆(A−1) = ∆(A2)
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1 2 3
1 $20,000 $20,000 $0
2 $30,000 $0 $0
Figure 2: Payoff matrix for Alice in example 3.7. Rows and columns correspond to Alice’s
and Bob’s actions respectively. The amount in each cell corresponds to Alice’s payoff.
be the belief of Alice. Then, as considered in section 1, Alice faces the lottery L1 =
{(0.34, $20, 000); (0.66, $0)} if she plays action 1 and the lotteryL2 = {(0.17, $30, 000); (0.83, $0)}
if she plays action 2. We retain the CPT features for Alice, as in example 2.1, viz.: r = 0,
v(x) = x0.8 for x ≥ 0, and
w+(p) = exp{−(− ln p)0.6}.
We saw that V1(L1) = 968.96, V1(L2) = 932.29, and V (16/17L1 + 1/17L2) = 1022.51
(all decimal numbers in this example are correct to two decimal places). Amongst all
the mixtures, the maximum CPT value is achieved at the unique mixture L∗ = α∗L1 +
(1−α∗)L2, where α∗ = 0.96; we have V1(L∗) = 1023.16. Thus, A1(µ−1) = {1{1}} and
B1(µ−1) = {(α∗, 1− α∗)}.
For any black-box strategy profile b−i of the opponents, let µ−i(b−i) ∈ ∆(A−i) be
the induced belief given by
µ−i(b−i)[a−i] :=
∏
j 6=i
bj [a−i].
Definition 3.8. A black-box strategy profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) is said to be a black-box
strategy Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, we have
bi ∈ Bi(µ−i(b−i)).
If the players have EUT preferences, a conjecture profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a mixed
action Nash equilibrium if and only if the black-box strategy profile b = (b1, . . . , bn),
where bi = σi, for all i ∈ N , is a black-box strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus, under
EUT, the notion of a black-box strategy Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the notion of a
mixed action Nash equilibrium, although there is still a conceptual difference between
these two notions based on the interpretations for the mixtures of actions. Further, we
have the existence of a black-box strategy Nash equilibrium for any game when players
have EUT preferences from the well-known result about the existence of a mixed action
Nash equilibrium. The following example shows that, in general, a black-box strategy
Nash equilibrium may not exist when players have CPT preferences.
Example 3.9. Consider a 2 × 2 game (i.e a 2-player game where each player has two
actions {0, 1}) with the payoff matrices as shown in figure 3. Let the reference points be
r1 = r2 = 0. Let vi(·) be the identity function for i = 1, 2. Let the probability weighting
functions for gains for the two players be given by
w+i (p) = exp{−(− ln p)γi}, for i = 1, 2,
where γ1 = 0.5 and γ2 = 1. We do not need the probability weighting functions for
losses since all the outcomes lie in the gains domain for both the players. Notice that
player 2 has EUT preferences since w+2 (p) = p.
Suppose player 1 and player 2 play black-box strategies (1 − p, p) and (1 − q, q),
respectively, where p, q ∈ [0, 1]. With an abuse of notation, we identify these black-box
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0 1
0 4 0
1 3 1
0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
Figure 3: Payoff matrices for the 2 × 2 game in example 3.9 (left matrix for player 1 and
right matrix for player 2). The rows and the columns correspond to the actions of player 1
and player 2, respectively, and the entries in the cell represent the corresponding payoffs.
strategies by p and q, respectively. The corresponding lottery faced by player 1 is given
by
L1(p, q) := {(µ[0, 0], 4); (µ[1, 0], 3); (µ[1, 1], 1); (µ[0, 1], 0)},
where µ[0, 0] := (1− p)(1− q), µ[1, 0] := p(1− q), µ[0, 1] := (1− p)q, and µ[1, 1] := pq.
By (2.2), the CPT value of the lottery faced by player 1 is given by
V1(L1(p, q)) := 4×
[
w+1 (µ[0, 0])
]
+ 3× [w+1 (µ[0, 0] + µ[1, 0])− w+1 (µ[0, 0]))]
+ 1× [w+1 (µ[0, 0] + µ[1, 0] + µ[1, 1])− w+1 (µ[0, 0] + µ[1, 0])] .
The plot of the function V1(L1(p, q)) with respect to p, for q = 0.3 and q = 0.35, is
shown in figure 4. We observe that the best response black-box strategy setB1(µ−1(q))
of player 1 to player 2’s black-box strategy q ∈ B2 satisfies the following: B1(µ−1(q)) =
{0} for q < q∗, B1(µ−1(q)) = {0, p∗} for q = q∗, and B1(µ−1(q)) ⊂ [p∗, 1] for q > q∗,
where p∗ = 0.996 and q∗ = 0.340 (here the numbers are correct to three decimal points).
Further, B1(µ−1(q)) is singleton for q ∈ (q∗, 1] and the unique element in B1(µ−1(q))
increases monotonically with respect to q from p∗ to 1 (see figure 5). In particular,
B1(µ−1(1)) = {1}. The lottery faced by player 2 is given by
L2(p, q) := {(µ[0, 0], 0); (µ[1, 0], 1); (µ[1, 1], 0); (µ[0, 1], 1)},
and the CPT value of player 2 for this lottery is given by V2(L2(p, q)) = p(1−q)+q(1−p).
The best response black-box strategy setB2(µ−2(p)) of player 2 to player 1’s black-box
strategy p ∈ B1 satisfies the following: B2(µ−2(p)) = {1} for p < 0.5, B2(µ−2(p)) =
[0, 1] for p = 0.5, and B2(µ−2(p)) = {0} for p > 0.5. As a result, see figure 5, there
does not exist any (p′, q′) such that p′ ∈ B1(µ−1(q′)) and q′ ∈ B2(µ−2(p′)), and hence
no black-box strategy Nash equilibrium exists for this game.
Let τi ∈P(Bi) denote a conjecture over the black-box strategy of player i. This will
induce a conjecture σi(τi) ∈ ∆(Ai) over the action of player i, given by
σi(τi)[ai] = Eτibi[ai].
Given conjectures over black-box strategies (τj ∈ ∆(Bj), j 6= i), let σ−i(τ−i) := (σj(τj))j 6=i.
Definition 3.10. A profile of conjectures over black-box strategies τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) is said
to be a mixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, we have
bi ∈ Bi(µ−i(σ−i(τ−i))), for all bi ∈ supp τi.
Proposition 3.11. For a profile of conjectures σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n), consider the condition
σ∗i ∈ co(Bi(µ−i(σ∗−i))), for all i. (3.3)
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Figure 4: The CPT value of player 1 in example 3.9. Here, p and q denote the black-box
strategies for player 1 and 2, respectively. Note the rise and sharp drop in the two curves
near p = 1. For the curve for q = 0.3, the global maximum is attained at p = 0, whereas, for
the curve for q = 0.35, the global maximum is attained close to p = 1, specifically for some
p ∈ [0.9, 1].
Figure 5: The figure (not to scale) shows the best response black-box strategy sets of the
two players for the game in example 3.9. The red (dashed) line shows the best response
black-box strategy set of player 2 in response to the black-box strategy (1−p, p) of player 1.
The green (solid) line shows the best response black-box strategy set of player 1 in response
to the black-box strategy (1 − q, q) of player 2. Note that there is no intersection of these
lines.
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(i) If τ is a mixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium, then the profile of conjectures
σ∗, where σ∗i = σi(τi),∀i, satisfies (3.3).
(ii) If σ∗ satisfies (3.3), then there exists a profile of finite support conjectures on black-
box strategies τ˙ = (τ˙1, . . . , τ˙n), where τ˙i ∈ ∆f (Bi),∀i, that is a mixed black-box
strategy Nash equilibrium, such that σ∗i = σi(τ˙i),∀i.
Proof. Suppose τ is a mixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium. Let σ∗i = σi(τi). Then,
for all bi ∈ supp τi, we have bi ∈ Bi(µ−i(σ∗−i)), and hence σ∗i ∈ co(Bi(µ−i(σ∗−i))). This
proves statement (i).
For statement (ii), suppose σ∗ satisfies condition (3.3). In fact, by lemma 3.6 we
have, σ∗i ∈ co(Bi(µ−i(σ∗−i))) ⊂ ∆(Ai), and by Caratheodory’s theorem, σ∗i is a convex
combination of at most |Ai| elements inBi(µ−i(σ∗−i)). Hence, we can construct a mixed
black-box strategy Nash equilibrium τ˙ such that τ˙i ∈ ∆f (Bi) and σ∗i = σi(τ˙i),∀i.
The content of this proposition is that in order to determine whether a profile τ of
conjectures on black box strategies is a mixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium or
not it suffices to study the associated profile of conjectures on actions that is induced by
τ . This justifies the study of the set mBBNE discussed below.
Theorem 3.12. For any game Γ, there exists a profile of conjectures σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n)
that satisfies (3.3).
Proof. The idea is to use the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, as in the proof of the exis-
tence of mixed action Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1950]. Assume the usual topology on Si,
for each i, and let S have the corresponding product topology. The set S is a non-empty
compact convex subset of the Euclidean space
∏
i R
|Ai|. Let K(σ) be the set-valued
function given by
K(σ) :=
∏
i
co(Bi(µ−i(σ−i))),
for all σ ∈ S. Since co(Bi(µ−i(σ−i))) is non-empty and convex for each i (lemma 3.6),
the function K(σ) is non-empty and convex for any σ ∈ S. We now show that the
function K(·) has a closed graph. Let {σt}∞t=1 and {st}∞t=1 be two sequences in S that
converge to σ¯ and s¯, respectively, and let st ∈ K(σt) for all t. It is enough to show that
s¯ ∈ K(σ¯). For all si ∈ Si, σ−i ∈ S−i, let
V˜i(si, σ−i) := sup
τi∈P(Bi),
Eτibi=si
EτiVi ({(µ(bi, µ−i(σ−i))[a], xi(a))}a∈A) .
Since the product distribution µ(bi, µ−i(σ−i)) is jointly continuous in bi and σ−i, and, as
noted earlier, Vi(p, z) is continuous with respect to the probability vector p, for any fixed
outcome profile z, the function Vi ({µ(bi, µ−i(σ−i))[a], xi(a)}a∈A) is jointly continuous
in bi and σ−i. This implies that the function V˜i(si, σ−i) is jointly continuous in si and
σ−i (see Appendix A). From the definition of V˜i, it follows that
max
si∈∆(Ai)
V˜i(si, σ−i) = max
bi∈Bi
Vi ({(µ(bi, µ−i(σ−i))[a], xi(a))}a∈A) .
Indeed, the maximum on the left-hand side is well-defined since ∆(Ai) is a compact
space and V˜i(·, σ−i) is a continuous function. The maximum on the right-hand side
is well-defined and the maximum is achieved by all bi ∈ Bi(µ−i(σ−i)) (lemma 3.6).
Hence,
arg max
si∈∆(Ai)
V˜i(si, σ−i) = co(Bi(µ−i(σ−i))).
13
Since sti ∈ co(Bi(µ−i(σ¯t−i))), for all t, we have
V˜i(s
t
i, σ
t
−i) ≥ V˜i(s˜i, σt−i), for all s˜i ∈ Si.
Since V˜i(si, σ−i) is jointly continuous in si and σ−i, we get
V˜i(s¯i, σ¯−i) ≥ V˜i(s˜i, σ¯−i), for all s˜i ∈ Si.
Hence we have s¯i ∈ co(Bi(µ−i(σ¯t−i))). This shows that the function K(·) has a closed
graph. By the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, there exists σ∗ such that σ∗ ∈ K(σ∗), i.e.
σ∗ satisfies condition (3.3) [Kakutani, 1941]. This completes the proof.
Corollary 3.13. For any finite game Γ, there exists a mixed black-box strategy Nash equi-
librium. In particular, there is one that is a profile of finite support conjectures over the
black-box strategies of players.
Proof. Follows from theorem 3.12 and statement (ii) of proposition 3.11.
We now compare the different notions of Nash equilibrium defined above. To that
end, we will associate each of the equilibrium notions with their corresponding natural
profile of mixtures over actions. For example, corresponding to any pure Nash equilib-
rium a = (a1, . . . , an), assign the profile of mixtures over actions (1{a1}, . . . ,1{an}) ∈
S. Let pNE ⊂ S denote the set of all profiles of mixtures over actions that correspond
to pure Nash equilibria. Let mNE ⊂ S denote the set of all mixed action Nash equilibria
σ ∈ S. Let BBNE ⊂ S denote the set of all black-box strategy Nash equilibria b ∈ S.
Corresponding to any mixed black-box strategy Nash equilibrium τ = (τ1, . . . , τn), as-
sign the profiles of mixtures over actions (σ1(τ1), . . . , σn(τn)) ∈ S, and let mBBNE ⊂ S
denote the set of all such profiles. Note that each of the above subsets depends on the
underlying game Γ and the CPT features of the players.
Proposition 3.14. For any fixed game Γ and CPT features of the players, we have
(i) pNE ⊂ mNE,
(ii) pNE ⊂ BBNE, and
(iii) BBNE ⊂ mBBNE.
Proof. The proof of statement (i) can be found in Keskin [2016].
For statement (ii), let (1{a1}, . . . ,1{an}) ∈ pNE. For a black-box strategy bi of
player i, the belief µ−i = 1{a−i} of player i gives rise to the lottery {(bi[a′i], xi(a′i, a−i))}a′i∈Ai .
From the definition of CPT value (see equation (2.2)), we observe that Vi({(bi[a′i], xi(a′i, a−i))}a′i∈Ai)
is optimal as long as the probability distribution bi does not assign positive probability
to any suboptimal outcome. Hence,
Bi(1{a−i}) = co(1{a′i} ∈ Si : a′i ∈ Ai(1{a−i})).
In particular, 1{ai} ∈ Bi(1{a−i}), and hence (1{a1}, . . . ,1{an}) ∈ BBNE.
Statement (iii) follows directly from the definitions 3.8 and 3.10.
In the following, we show via examples that each of the labeled regions ((a)–(g)),
in figure 6, is non-empty in general.
Example 3.15. For each of the seven regions in figure 6, we provide a 2×2 game with the
accompanying CPT features for the two players verifying that the corresponding region
is non-empty. Let the action sets be A1 = A2 = {0, 1}. With an abuse of notation, let
p, q ∈ [0, 1] denote the mixtures over actions for players 1 and 2, respectively, where
p and q are the probabilities corresponding to action 1 for both the players. Thus, the
set of all profiles of mixtures over actions is S = {(p, q) : p, q ∈ [0, 1]}. Let L1(p, q)
and L2(p, q) denote the corresponding lotteries faced by the two players. (All decimal
numbers in these examples are correct to three decimal places.)
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Figure 6: Venn diagram depicting the different notions of equilibrium as subsets of the set
S =
∏
i ∆(Ai). The sets marked pNE,mNE,BBNE, and mBBNE represent the sets of pure
Nash equilibria, mixed action Nash equilibria, black-box strategy Nash equilibria, andmixed
black-box strategy Nash equilibria, respectively. Examples are given in the body of the text
of CPT games lying in each of the indicated regions (a) through (g).
(a) Let both the players have EUT preferences with their utility functions given by the
identity functions ui(x) = x, for i = 1, 2. Let the payoff matrix be as shown in
figure 7a. Clearly, (p = 0, q = 0) ∈ pNE.
(b) Let ri = 0, vi(x) = x, for i = 1, 2. Let w+1 (p) = p
0.5 and w+2 (p) = p, for p ∈ [0, 1].
Let the payoff matrix be as shown in figure 7b, where β := 1/w+1 (0.5) = 1.414. We
have
L1(p, q) = {((1− p)(1− q), 2β); (p(1− q), β + 1); (pq, 1); ((1− p)q, 0)}.
The way β is defined, we get V1(L1(0, 0.5)) = V1(L1(1, 0.5)) = 2. Also, observe that
V2(L2(0.5, 0)) = V2(L2(0.5, q)) = V2(L2(0.5, 1)),∀q ∈ [0, 1]. With these observa-
tions, we get that (0.5, 0.5) ∈ mNE. We have, arg maxp∈[0,1] V1(L1(p, 0.5)) = {p′},
where p′ = 0.707 (see figure 8). Hence 0.5 /∈ co(B1(µ−1(0.5))) and (0.5, 0.5) /∈
mBBNE.
(c) Let the CPT features for both the players be as in (b). Let the payoff matrix be
as shown in figure 7c, where β := 1/w+1 (0.5) = 1.414 and γ = (1 − p′)/p′ (here
p′ = 0.707 as in (b)). As observed in (b),B1(µ−1(0.5)) = {p′}. From the definition
of γ, we see that player 2 is indifferent between her two actions, given her belief p′
over player 1’s actions. Thus (p′, 0.5) ∈ (mNE ∩ BBNE)\pNE.
(d) Let ri = 0, vi(x) = x, for i = 1, 2. Let w−1 (p) = p
0.5, w+2 (p) = p. Let the payoff ma-
trix be as shown in figure 7d, where β := 1/w−1 (0.5) = 1.414. Note that the payoffs
for player 1 are negations of her payoffs in (b), and her probability weighing func-
tion for losses is same as her probability weighing function for gains in (b). Thus
her CPT value function V1(L1(p, q)) is the negation of her CPT value function in (b).
In particular, we have V1(L1(0, 0.5)) = V1(L1(1, 0.5)) > V1(L1(p, 0.5)) for all p ∈
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0 1
0 1, 1 0, 0
1 0, 0 0, 0
(a) pNE
0 1
0 2β, 0 0, 1
1 β + 1, 1 1, 0
(b) mNE\mBBNE
0 1
0 2β, 0 0, 1
1 β + 1, γ 1, 0
(c) (mNE ∩ BBNE)\pNE
0 1
0 −2β, 0 0, 1
1 −(β + 1), 1 −1, 0
(d) (mNE ∩mBBNE)\BBNE
0 1
0 2β + , 0 0, 1
1 β + 1, γ 1, 0
(e) BBNE\mNE
0 1
0 4, 0 0, 1
1 3, 1 1, 0
(f) mBBNE\(mNE ∪ BBNE)
Figure 7: Payoff matrices for the 2 × 2 games in example 3.15. The rows and the columns
correspond to the actions of player 1 and player 2, respectively. In each cell, the left and
right entries correspond to player 1 and player 2, respectively. The labels indicate the cor-
responding regions in figure 6. The game matrix for the example corresponding to region
(g) is the same as that for the one corresponding to region (a).
(0, 1). Thus, 0.5 ∈ co(B1(µ−1(0.5))), but 0.5 /∈ B1(µ−1(0.5)). The payoffs and CPT
features of player 2 are same as in (b). Thus, (0.5, 0.5) ∈ (mNE∩mBBNE)\BBNE.
(e) Let the CPT features for both the players be as in (b). Let the payoff matrix be
as shown in figure 7e, where β := 1/w+1 (0.5) = 1.414,  = 0.1, and γ := (1 −
p˜)/p˜; here p˜ = 0.582 is the unique maximizer of V1(L1(p, 0.5)) (see figure 9). We
have V1(L1(0, 0.5)) = 2.071 > 2 = V1(L1(1, 0.5)) and arg maxp V1(L1(p, 0.5)) =
{p˜} with V1(L1(p˜, 0.5)) = 2.125. From the definition of γ, we see that player 2 is
indifferent between her two actions, given her belief p˜ over player 1’s actions. Thus,
(p˜, 0.5) ∈ BBNE\mNE.
(f) Let the CPT features be as in example 3.9. Let p∗ = 0.996 and q∗ = 0.340 be the
same as in example 3.9. Let the payoffmatrix be as shown in figure 7f. Note that the
payoffs for both the players are the same as in example 3.9. RecallB1(µ−1(q)) = 0
for q < q∗, B1(µ−1(q)) = {0, p∗} for q = q∗, and B1(µ−1(q)) ⊂ [p∗, 1] for q >
q∗, and hence 0.5 ∈ co(B1(µ−1(q∗))) and 0.5 /∈ B1(µ−1(q∗)). Further, from the
definition of γ, we have V2(L2(0.5, 0)) = V2(L2(0.5, q)) = V2(L2(0.5, 1)),∀q ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, (0.5, q∗) ∈ mBBNE\(mNE ∩ BBNE).
(g) Finally, if we let the players have EUT preferences and the payoffs as in (a), then
(1, 0) /∈ (mNE ∪mBBNE).
4 Conclusion
In the study of non-cooperative game theory from a decision-theoretic viewpoint, it is
important to distinguish between two types of randomization:
1. conscious randomizations implemented by the players, and
2. randomizations in conjectures resulting from the beliefs held by the other players
about the behavior of a given player.
This difference becomes evident when the preferences of the players over lotteries do
not satisfy betweenness, a weakened form of independence property. We considered
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Figure 8: The CPT value function for
player 1 in example 3.15(b), when q =
0.5 is the mixture of actions of player 2.
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Figure 9: The CPT value function for
player 1 in example 3.15(e), when q =
0.5 is the mixture of actions of player 2.
Type of Nash equilibrium Strategies Conjectures Always exists
Pure Nash equilibrium Pure actions Exact conjectures No
Mixed action Nash
equilibrium
Pure actions Mixed conjectures Yes [Keskin,
2016]
Black-box strategy Nash
equilibrium
Black box
strategies
Exact conjectures No
(Example 3.9)
Mixed black-box strategy
Nash equilibrium
Black box
strategies
Mixed conjectures Yes (Theo-
rem 3.12)
Table 1: Different types of Nash equilibrium when players have CPT preferences.
n-player normal form games where players have CPT preferences, an important ex-
ample of preference relation that does not satisfy betweenness. This gives rise to four
types of Nash equilibrium notions, depending on the different types of randomizations.
We defined these different notions of equilibrium and discussed the question of their
existence. The results are summarized in table 1.
A Joint continuity of the concave hull of a jointly con-
tinuous function
Let∆m−1 and∆n−1 be simplices of the corresponding dimensions with the usual topolo-
gies. Let f : ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 → R be a continuous function on ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 (with the
product topology). LetP(∆m−1) denote the space of all probability measures on ∆m−1
with the topology of weak convergence. Let g : ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 → R be given by
g(x, y) := sup
{
EX∼pf(X, y)
∣∣p ∈P(∆m−1),EX∼p id(X) = x} .
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where id : ∆m−1 → ∆m−1 is the identity function id(x) := x, ∀x ∈ ∆m−1 and the
expectation is over a random variable X taking values in ∆m−1 with the distribution p.
Proposition A.1. The function g(x, y) is continuous on ∆m−1 ×∆n−1.
Proof. We first prove that the function g(x, y) is upper semi-continuous. Let xt → x
and yt → y. Let {g(xtn , ytn)} be a convergent subsequence of {g(xt, yt)} with limit
L. It is enough to show that the limit L ≤ g(x, y). Since for all n the set {p ∈
P(∆m−1),EX∼p id(X) = xtn} is compact, we know that there exists ptn ∈P(∆m−1),
such that g(xtn , ytn) = EX∼ptn [f(X, ytn)] and EX∼ptn [id(X)] = xtn . The sequence{ptn} has a convergent subsequence, say ptnk → p¯ (because P(∆m−1) is a compact
space). Now, EX∼p¯[id(X)] = limk EX∼ptnk [id(X)] = limk xtnk = x. Further, EX∼ptnk [f(X, ytnk )]→
EX∼p¯[f(X, y)], since the product distributions ptnk×1{ytnk }, for all k, on ∆m−1×∆n−1,
converge weakly to the product distribution p¯ × 1{y}. Thus, L = EX∼p¯[f(X, y)] ≤
g(x, y) and the function g(x, y) is upper-semicontinuous.
We now prove that the function g(x, y) is lower semi-continuous. Let xt → x and
yt → y. The simplex ∆m−1 can be triangulated into finitely many other simplices, say
T1, . . . , Tk, whose vertices are x and some m − 1 of the m vertices of ∆m−1. Let (xtn)
be any subsequence such that all xtn ∈ Tj for some simplex. It is enough to show that
the lim inf of the sequence {g(xtn , ytn)} is greater than or equal to g(x, y). Let the other
vertices of Tj be e1, . . . , em−1. Let ztn = (z
1
tn , . . . , z
l
tn) be the barycentric coordinates of
xtn with respect to the simplex Tj , i.e.
xtn = (1− z1tn − · · · − zm−1tn )x+ z1tne1 + · · ·+ zm−1tn em−1.
The function g(x, y) is concave in x for any fixed y by construction. We have,
g(xtn , ytn) ≥ (1− z1tn − · · · − zm−1tn )g(x, ytn) + z1tng(e1, ytn) + · · ·+ zm−1tn g(em−1, ytn).
Since ztn → (0, . . . , 0) and g(e1, ytn), . . . , g(em−1, ytn) are all finite we get,
lim inf g(xtn , ytn) ≥ lim inf g(x, ytn).
Let p˜ ∈ P(∆m−1) be such that EX∼p˜[f(X, y)] = g(x, y) and EX∼p˜[id(X)] = x. Then,
g(x, ytn) ≥ EX∼p¯[f(X, ytn)], for all n, and hence,
lim inf g(x, ytn) ≥ lim inf EX∼p˜[f(X, ytn)] = g(x, y).
This shows that the function g(x, y) is lower semi-continuous.
Since the function g(x, y) is upper and lower semi-continuous, it is continuous.
B An interesting functional equation
Lemma B.1. Let w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a continuous, strictly increasing function such
that w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. For any 0 ≤ a1 < c1 < b < c2 < a2 ≤ 1 such that
(a2 − b)(b− c1) = (b− a1)(c2 − b), let
[w(a2)− w(b)] [w(b)− w(c1)] = [w(b)− w(a1)] [w(c2)− w(b)] . (B.1)
Then w(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Taking a1 = 0, c1 = 1/4, b = 1/2, c2 = 3/4 and a2 = 1 in (B.1) we get,
[1− w(1/2)] [w(1/2)− w(1/4)] = [w(1/2)] [w(3/4)− w(1/2)] ,
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and hence,
w(3/4) =
w(1/2) + w(1/2)w(1/4)− w(1/4)
w(1/2)
.
Note that w(1/2) > 0. Taking a1 = 0, c1 = 1/4, b = 1/3, c2 = 1/2 and a2 = 1 in (B.1)
we get,
[1− w(1/3)] [w(1/3)− w(1/4)] = [w(1/3)] [w(1/2)− w(1/3)] ,
and hence,
w(1/3) =
w(1/4)
1− w(1/2) + w(1/4) .
Note that 1−w(1/2) +w(1/4) > 1−w(1/2) > 0. Taking a1 = 0, c1 = 1/3, b = 1/2, c2 =
2/3 and a2 = 1 in (B.1) we get,
[1− w(1/2)] [w(1/2)− w(1/3)] = [w(1/2)] [w(2/3)− w(1/2)] ,
and substituting for w(1/3) we get,
w(2/3) =
w(1/2)− w(1/2)2 + 2w(1/2)w(1/4)− w(1/4)
w(1/2)− w(1/2)2 + w(1/2)w(1/4) .
Note that
w(1/2)− w(1/2)2 + w(1/2)w(1/4) = w(1/2)[1− w(1/2) + w(1/4)] > 0.
Taking a1 = 0, c1 = 1/2, b = 2/3, c2 = 3/4 and a2 = 1 in (B.1) we get,
[1− w(2/3)] [w(2/3)− w(1/2)] = [w(2/3)] [w(3/4)− w(2/3)] .
Simplifying we get,
w(2/3)− w(2/3)w(3/4) = w(1/2)− w(1/2)w(2/3),
Substituting for w(2/3) and w(3/4) we get,[
w(1/2)− w(1/2)2 + 2w(1/2)w(1/4)− w(1/4)
w(1/2)− w(1/2)2 + w(1/2)w(1/4)
] [
w(1/4)− w(1/2)w(1/4)
w(1/2)
]
= w(1/2)
[
w(1/4)− w(1/2)w(1/4)
w(1/2)− w(1/2)2 + w(1/2)w(1/4)
]
.
Since w(1/4)− w(1/2)w(1/4) > 0 and w(1/2)− w(1/2)2 + w(1/2)w(1/4) > 0, we get
w(1/2)− w(1/4) = 2w(1/2)[w(1/2)− w(1/4)].
Since w(1/2)− w(1/4) > 0, we get w(1/2) = 1/2.
For any fixed 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1, let
w′(p′) :=
w(p′(y − x) + x)− w(x)
w(y)− w(x) , for all 0 ≤ p
′ ≤ 1.
Note that w′ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a continuous, strictly increasing function with w′(0) = 0
and w′(1) = 1. Further, if 0 ≤ a′1 < c′1 < b′ < c′2 < a′2 ≤ 1 are such that (a′2 − b′)(b′ −
c′1) = (b
′ − a′1)(c′2 − b′), then
[w′(a′2)− w′(b′)] [w′(b′)− w′(c′1)] = [w′(b′)− w′(a′1)] [w′(c′2)− w′(b′)] .
Thus w′(1/2) = 1/2 and hence w ((x+ y)/2) = (w(x) + w(y))/2. Using this repeatedly
we get w(k/2t) = k/2t, for 0 ≤ k ≤ 2t, t = 1, 2, . . . . Continuity of w then implies
w(p) = p, for all p ∈ [0, 1].
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